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Abstract—The increasing production costs of electronic de-
vices and changes in the design methods of integrated circuits
(ICs) has led to emerging threats in the microelectronics industry.
Today, high value chips are the target of counterfeiting, theft
and malicious hardware insertion (such as hardware trojans).
Intellectual property (IP) protection has become a major concern
and we propose to fight counterfeiting and theft by designing
salutary hardware (salware). Instead of insert malicious effects
inside an IP like a malware (e.g. a hardware trojan), a salware
uses the same techniques, strategies and means for IP protection.
One of the most studied salware is IP watermarking.
Many works propose to target the finite state machine of digital
IP to perform the watermarking. But, most of the time, the
verification of the watermark is not clearly described. This
conduces to a lack of credibility of these works. This paper
proposes a watermark verification scheme using a correlation
analysis based on the measurement of the IC power consumption.
This article presents this process of verification and also discusses
the selection of its parameters according to experimental results.
Keywords—Hardware Security, salutary hardware, IP protec-
tion, IC counterfeiting, IP watermarking, side channel analysis,
power consumption analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
For several years, the microelectronic industry is facing
the increase of costs of integrated circuits (ICs) production.
This is due to the increasing complexity of systems and to the
expensive technology refinement (e.g. the transition from 32
nm to 28 nm technology has been accompanied by a 40%
increase in the manufacturing costs of wafers 300 mm in
diameter and by a 30% increase in the manufacturing costs of
450 mm wafers). As a result, this industry has seen relocation
of its production facilities and a sharp increase in the number
of fabless companies (companies which do not produce ICs
themselves). Time-to-market is increasingly tight and the in-
crease of fabless companies has also led to a new method
of ICs design, based on the reuse of intellectual property
(IP) blocks. Thus, ICs manufactured today are produced with
a high amount added value in a high competitive industry!
All these changes has made electronic devices the target of
counterfeiting, illegal cloning, theft and malicious hardware
insertion (such as hardware trojans) [1].
The counterfeiting of ICs has become a major problem
in recent years [2]. For example, the number of counterfeit
electronic circuits seized by U.S. Customs between 2001 and
2011 has been multiplied by around 700 [3]. Between 2007
and 2010, U.S. Customs confiscated 5.6 million counterfeit
electronic products [4]. Overall, counterfeiting is estimated to
account for about 7% of the semiconductor market [5], which
represents a loss of around US$ 10 billion per year for the
lawful industry.
Design salutary hardwares (salwares) [6] is a way to protect
IPs against these emerging threats. Salwares use the same
techniques, strategies and means as malicious hardware (mal-
wares) such as hardware trojans but instead of including some
malicious effect inside an IC (secret leakage, malfunctions
...), salwares add protection to the chip. Exactly as hardware
trojans, salwares are hardly detectable and difficult to remove.
Examples of well-known salwares include physical unclonable
functions (also known as PUF) for IC authentication, memory
encryption, hardware metering, logic encryption, IC metering
[7], remote activation [8] or IP watermarking [9].
For IP watermarking techniques, the verification of the
watermark has two main objectives. The first one is the
detection of illegal copies (illegal copies of an IP are also
called clones). This case is detected when the creator of an
IP find its watermark inside a product of another party who
did not pay for the right to use the IP. In this case, the
verification of the watermark can be used as proof in front
of a court. The second objective of the watermark verification
is to detect counterfeit IPs. This case is detected when an
IPs without the mark is found among an set of ICs which
contain the watermarked IP. The above arguments show that
the verification method in watermarked IP research is as just
as important as the watermark embedding method and the
verification process must be precisely described.
In this paper, we address the problem of verification of
watermarked finite state machines (FSMs). The verification
scheme of the IP watermark uses a correlation analysis based
on the measurement of the power consumption of an IC.
The power consumption is called the side channel (as it is
used for cryptographic research [10]). In order to make this
verification possible, a lightweight component which amplifies
the side channel leakage is added to the IP. This component
only highlight the state transition of the FSM by bringing
non-linearity but does not interfere with the working FSM.
In addition, it reduces the risk of collision between different
IPs with the same FSM.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next sec-
tion talks about IP watermarking and verification approaches.
The Section III describes the correlation computation process
used in the IP watermark verification. Section IV presents
FSMs designed in order to perform IP watermark verifica-
tion experiments and gather experimental results. Section V
presents an analysis on different distinguishers used for the
IP watermark verification. Finally, Section VI concludes the
paper.
II. IP WATERMARKING
The concept of watermarking is well known for multimedia
applications such as images, music or movies. The same
approaches are used to insert a so called watermark inside
digital IPs in order to provide a solution to protect the IP
designer against counterfeiting and illegal copying. A survey
on IP watermarking techniques is provided in [11] where
requirements for general IP watermarking solutions are also
presented. The usual method of watermarking is to insert the
mark inside the FSM of an IP. In the related literature, the
traditional way to do this is to add redundancy inside the FSM
by adding new states and/or new transitions to the original
FSM [12]. Thus, many FSM watermarking techniques are
based on finding a solution to the graph partitioning [9] or to
the graph coloring problem [13]. In [14], a new scheme of IP
protection based on the extraction of specific FSM properties
is proposed. Inserting the watermark inside the FSM of an
IP has an advantage in that it makes it difficult to remove
without damaging the functionality of the IP but it also makes
it difficult to reforge a new valid watermark. In its most general
form, the generic IP watermark scheme can be defined based
on the embedding and detection (or verification) processes in
Figure 1, similar to the model in [15].
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Fig. 1. Generic IP watermarking scheme: an object (O) is transformed into
a watermarked object (O˜) using a watermark (W) and/or a secret key (K)
in the embedding process. In the detection process, an object-under-test (O˜’)
is verified, generally using the secret key (K), W, and/or O, depending on a
watermark system [15]
For the verification of the inserted watermark, different
approaches are also available. For example, it is possible to
read the answer of the IC to a specific input sequence [16]. A
side channel verification technique is proposed in [17] where
specific inputs are also used to create a specific leakage. In
[18], a side channel verification is performed using the power
consumption of an IP as a physical hash function for the
identification of the IP. These two last examples are very
specific to cryptographic systems which are really different
and possess very specific properties allowing the functions to
be easily differentiated. The proposal of this article is based
uniquely on the FSM of an IP. FSMs are the most important
part of any digital synchronous IP. So, the proposed method
is not application-dependent and can be adapted to any kind
of digital systems which possess a FSM.
There are many reasons that it is very interesting to
insert a watermark inside the FSM of an IP. First of all, the
insertion can be performed automatically during the synthesis
of the IP. In addition, it makes the watermark very difficult to
remove because modifying complex FSM without damaging
the intended system behavior is difficult. But, for this type of
watermarking, the verification may be more difficult. Indeed,
in many case, an access to state registers is needed and this
access is not easy when the IP is embedded inside a complete
integrated system. Thus, verification using measurement of
the power consumption of an IC is the solution proposed in
this article. This side channel contains a lot of information
linked to the global switching activity of an IC (gates, registers,
Inputs/Outputs...).
In order to prove that it is possible to access information
about the FSM of a device via its power consumption, a new
verification process is proposed in the following section.
III. SIDE CHANNEL VERIFICATION: CORRELATION
COMPUTATION PROCESS
In this part, let’s assume that the owner of a device wants
to test if a device under test (DUT ) contains the owner’s
watermarked IP. In order to verify the DUT ’s authenticity,
the owner provides one device manufactured in a trusted
manner - a reference device (RefD). The RefD does not
contains anything else that the original watermarked IP. The
verification method proposed uses the correlation between the
power consumption of the RefD and the DUT to determine
the DUT ’s authenticity. So, a correlation calculation process
must be defined in order to perform the verification.
To verify that a DUT contains the same watermarked FSM
as the RefD, a number n1 of power consumption traces are
measured on the RefD and grouped in a set called TRefD.
A large number n2 of power traces are also measured on the
DUT and grouped in the set called TDUT . Then k traces are
selected in TRefD using a function which randomly selects
k distinct elements uniformly inside a set X (noted UX(k)).
This function can be defined as follows:
∀k ∈ J1;nK, UX(k) = {e1, ..., ek}, such that
∀(i, j) ∈ J1; kK, i 6= j ⇔ ei 6= ej
The mean of selected traces is calculated and used as a
unique reference to the correlation computation. This averaged
trace is noted ARefD and defined as follow:
ARefD = mean(UTRefD (k))
The same operation is repeated to calculate a number m of
k-averaged traces with the set TDUT . The set noted ADUT
contains these m k-averaged traces and is defined by:
ADUT,m = {mean(UTDUT (k))}m
When all k-averaged traces are calculated, the correlation
between ARefD and each element of ADUT,m (an element
of this set is noted ADUT,m(i) with i ∈ J1;mK) is computed
using the Pearson coefficient defined by:
ρ(x, y) =
∑l
i=1(xi − x) · (yi − y)√∑l
i=1(xi − x)2 ·
∑l
i=1(yi − y)2
Where x and y are two traces of length l and x is the mean
of x.
The result of this process is a set of m correlation coeffi-
cients which is noted CRefD,DUT,m,k.
It is this set CRefD,DUT,m,k which is analyzed in order
to answer the question: Does the DUT contains the same
watermarked FSM as the RefD? In order to automatically
authenticate that the DUT contains the RefD, it is necessary
to use distinguishers. A discussion about which distinguishers
can be used is performed in Section V? Section V also
discusses about the choice of the parameters n1, n2, k and m
of the correlation computation process. Note that only one k-
average trace (ARefD) is used as reference in this computation
process; this ensures that all variations between the m elements
of the set CRefD,DUT,m,k are due anloy to the DUT and not to
the RefD. This correlation computation process is presented
as a flow schematic in Figure 2. With this illustration, it can
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Fig. 2. Flow of the correlation computation process with one RefD, one
DUT and the parameters n1, n2, k and m
be seen that this correlation process is a succession of three
different functions leading to the final set CRefD,DUT,m,k:
1 A set of traces Tdevice (device ∈ {RefD,DUT})
is the result of a power signal acquisition (Pw) with
the device and the number of measured traces (n) in
parameter:
Tdevice = Pw(device, n)
2 A set of averaged traces Adevice,m is the result of
a function mean which takes as one parameter a set
of randomly chosen traces in the set Tdevice and m
(representing the cardinal of the set Adevice,m) as the
other. For the random selection, the parameter is the
number of averaged traces (k):
Adevice,m = {mean(UTdevice(k))}m
3 Finally, the set of correlation coefficients
CRefD,DUT,m,k for two devices (RefD and DUT )
is defined by:
CRefD,DUT,m,k = {ρ(ARefD,1, ADUT,m)}
Note that when m = 1, the set Adevice,1 is noted Adevice.
IV. EXPERIMENT ON IP WATERMARK VERIFICATION
A. Designed FSMs
In order to perform experiments on watermarked IP ver-
ification using the correlation analysis process described in
Section III, four IPs are designed with two different types of
counters as FSM. The use of counters is the worst case for the
proposed verification scheme. Indeed, a counter is extremely
linear, cyclic and the amount of information leaked by the
power consumption signal is limited. So, by addressing the
problem of IP watermark verification with these worst case
kinds of FSMs, the effectiveness and the credibility of the
proposed verification method is also proven for systems with
more complex FSMs.
The first FSM is an 8-bit binary-counter and the second
is an 8-bit Gray-counter. A side channel leakage component
is added to these two FSMs. This component contains a
watermark key (Kw) and a substitution table of the Advance
Encryption Standard (AES) [19] called SBox. Substitution ta-
bles are strongly non-linear functions which replace each input
by a specific predetermined output. This kinds of functions
are commonly used in cryptography. Note that in this study,
the SBox implementation is done in memory and the space
required is 28 bits.
In order to verify that it is possible to identify different
FSMs, the two first IPs are created by using the same ran-
domly chosen value Kw1 for the key in the two FSMs. This
defines the two first IPs (IP A and IP B). By distinguishing
between these two FSMs, the watermark verification proposed
in Section III is proven for 2 different FSMs. To prove that
the watermark key (Kw) reduces the risk of collision between
two different IPs with the exact same FSM, two other IPs are
created using the 8-bit Gray-counter with two different values
for the watermark key (Kw2 and Kw3). This defines two new
IPs (IP C and IP D). Thus, four IPs are designed in order
to prove that it is possible to verify an IP watermark that has
been embedded without any addition of edge or state. Figure
3 shows the schematics of the four designed IPs.
These four FSMs are implemented inside four Altera
Cyclone 3 FPGAs to create four RefD (IP A, IP B,
IP C and IP D). The same IPs are implemented inside
four other FPGA Cyclone 3 in order to create four DUTs
(DUT#1, DUT#2, DUT#3 and DUT#4). Note that similar
results are obtained by using only one FPGA to perform all
measurements. According to this, the use of different FPGAs
shows that the proposed work is insensitive to the CMOS
variation process.
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Fig. 3. Designed IPs schematics with an FSM and the side channel leakage
component
In this experiment, all designed FSMs are strongly linear
(8-bit counters) and the side channel leakage component helps
the verification of an IP watermark because it brings some
non linearity to the sequence of verification states. It is also
important to note that it is not necessary to send specific
input vectors to the designed IPs because they are all input
independent. Furthermore, designed IPs are cyclic and it is
possible to known exactly the periodicity of the designed FSM
[14]. Thus, verification of watermarked FSMs is possible if the
state sequence is long enough, i.e. the state sequence must be
longer than the periodicity of the tested FSM. Nevertheless,
the same input sequence is sent to the four IPs to ensure that
the resulting state sequence has the same length in all tested
IPs. In addition, the four FSMs are placed in the exact same
state before starting any power consumption measurements.
B. Experimental results
The correlation computation process described in Section
III is used for the four RefDs with the four DUTs. For
the IP X (X ∈ {A,B,C,D}), the TIP X is created by
measuring 400 power consumption traces. 10, 000 power traces
are measured using the DUT#y with y ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} in order
to create the set TDUT#y .
Then, using k = 50 and m = 20, AIP X and the set
ADUT#y,20 are computed and defined by:
AIP X = mean(UTIP X (50))
and
ADUT#y,20 = {mean(UTDUT#y (50))}20
Finally, CX,y,50,20 is created by calculating the correlation
between AIP X and each element of ADUT#y . In Figure 4,
for X ∈ {A,B,C,D} the sub-figure titled IP X shows sets:
CX,1,50,20, CX,2,50,20, CX,3,50,20 and CX,4,50,20.
To detect which DUT contains the same watermarked
IP as each RefD, two distinguishers can be considered: the
higher mean of the correlation and the lower variance of the
correlation.
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Fig. 4. Verification of watermarked IP (IP A, IP B, IP C and IP D)
using the correlation computation process with k = 50 and m = 20.
If the higher mean of the correlation is considered as a
distinguisher, according to Figure 4, it is clear that DUT#3
contains IP C but even if it is not impossible, it is not
sure to determine which DUTs contains which IPs for IP A,
IP B and IP D. At the contrary, if the lower variance of
the correlation is considered, it is clear that DUT#1 contains
IP A, DUT#2 contains IP B, DUT#3 contains IP C
and DUT#4 contains IP D. The next section will give a
comprehensive analysis of the two distinguishers.
V. ANALYSIS
In this section, an analysis of the two previously mentioned
distinguishers (e.g. higher mean and lower variance of the
correlation) is done and the choice of parameters n1, n2, k
and m of the correlation computation process is discussed.
A. Distinguishers analysis
For this study, the mean of a set CX,y,k,m is noted CX,y,k,m
and the variance is noted v(CX,y,k,m). In order to analyze
the mean of the correlation as a distinguisher, let’s define
a so called confidence distance that gives a percentage of
confidence about a performed verification process (Figure 1).
This value is defined for one IP X (X ∈ {A,B,C,D}) by:
∆mean(X) = 100×
[
1− max2({CX,y,k,m, y ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}})
max({CX,y,k,m, y ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}})
]
where max2 is the function which gives the second highest
value in a set E. Table I shows the values of the mean of
the different set CX,y,k,m with X ∈ {A,B,C,D} and y ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4} and the mean confidence distance ∆mean for each
row.
TABLE I. MEANS OF THE DIFFERENT SETS OF CORRELATION
COEFFICIENTS
DUT#1 DUT#2 DUT#3 DUT#4 ∆mean
IP A 0.936 0.347 0.896 0.347 4%
IP B −0.104 0.941 0.473 0.936 0.52%
IP C 0.733 0.648 0.947 0.657 22.6%
IP D 0.225 0.940 0.748 0.947 0.78%
In the same way, the confidence distance of the variance
of the correlation is defined to analyze the variance as a
distinguisher. Let’s define ∆v by:
∆v(X) = 100×
[
1− min({v(CX,y,k,m), y ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}})
min2({v(CX,y,k,m), y ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}})
]
where min2 is the function which returns the second smallest
value in a set E. Table I shows the values of the variance of
the different set CX,y,k,m with X ∈ {A,B,C,D} and y ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4} and the variance confidence distance ∆v for each
row.
TABLE II. VARIANCE OF THE DIFFERENT SETS OF CORRELATION
COEFFICIENTS
DUT#1 DUT#2 DUT#3 DUT#4 ∆v
IP A 1.612e−5 1.831e−4 6.443e−5 1.477e−4 75%
IP B 2.925e−4 1.928e−5 3.008e−4 3.502e−5 44.9%
IP C 1.18e−4 1.66e−4 9.90e−7 1.47e−4 99.2%
IP D 1.91e−4 1.04e−5 1.53e−4 3.04e−6 70.66%
For both distinguishers (higher mean and lower variance
of the correlation), the higher the confidence distance is, the
better the distinguisher is. So, the right column of Table I
and Table II show that the variance of computed correlation
coefficients is a better distinguisher than the means of the
correlation coefficients. Indeed, the confidence distance of the
variance varies from 44.9% to 99.2% while the confidence
distance of the mean varies from 0.52% to 22.6%.
B. Parameter choice
The first two parameters to choose are n1 which is the size
of the set TRefD and n2 which is the size of the set TDUT . In
order to choose these parameters, it is necessary to take into
account the two other parameters k and m by respecting the
following expressions:
n1 ≥ k (1)
n2 ≥ k ×m (2)
Expression 1 is required to compute the set ARefD from
the set of traces TRefD. Expression 2 is required to compute
the set ADUT from the set TDUT . Nevertheless, because traces
in TDUT are randomly chosen, it is important to choose n2
high enough to minimize the probability of selecting one trace
of TDUT more than one time. The probability for one trace
ti, i ∈ J1, n2K of the set TDUT to appear in one selection of k
traces is:
P (ti) =
k
n2
Then, because n2 depends upon k and m, it is possible to find
a number α ∈ R, α ≥ 1 (Expression 2) such that:
n2 = αkm
By substituting this for n2 by this in the previous expression,
the probability to select the trace ti in one selection becomes:
P (ti) =
1
αm
Now, let’s call ζ the following event:
For m selections, the trace ti is selected more than one
time.
The probability of ζ can be defined by:
P (ζ) = 1−
1∑
l=0
(
m
l
)
P (ti)(1− P (ti))
So, for m selections in TDUT , the probability of ζ is:
P (ζ) = 1− (1 + m− 1
αm
)(1− 1
αm
)m−1
Looking at this, the first thing to note is that this probability
does not depend on the parameter k. Next, let’s note the last
expression is a function (fα(m)). This function has two very
interesting properties:
P1 : ∀m ∈ N, lim
α→+∞ fα(m) = 0.
P2 : ∀α ≥ 1, lim
m→+∞ fα(m) = 1− (
α+ 1
α
)e
−1
α .
The property P1 shows that m does not act on the probability
P (ζ). Indeed, P (ζ) is only defined by the number α (property
P1 and P2). So, in order to choose all parameters of the
correlation computation process described in Section III, the
most important thing to choose is this probability P (ζ),
because it allows to define all parameters. Once the probability
is selected and thus, the number α too, the parameter m can
be chosen to be as close as required of the limit of fα(m).
For example, let’s take α = 10. Figure 5 shows the function
f10(m) with its limit and a zone of available m to approach
the limit at 5%. In this picture, it can be seen that fα(m)
reaches its limit quickly, so m does not have to be very large.
Indeed, with α = 10, approaching the limit at 5% means to
select m ≥ 17. Note that this characteristic is true for all value
of α ≥ 1. In the experiment, Section IV, α = 10 and m = 20,
so the probability of the event ζ is fixed to: P (ζ) = 0.0045.
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Fig. 5. fα(m) for α = 10, with the limit and 5% area for m.
In addition, values for k and m have not had a significant
impact on the effectiveness of the proposed verification process
which is characterized by the confidence distance presented in
the Section V. Nevertheless, the parameter m has an impact
on the computation time of the correlation, so its choice is a
tradeoff between being very close to the selected probability
and the time required to compute the correlation coefficient.
For the last parameter (k), its choice determines the time of
the power consumption acquisition. Indeed, because it has
no impact on the probability of the event ζ, this parameter
only impacts the time required for measurement. In section
IV, the parameter k is set to 50. Thus, knowing α, m and
k, the number of measured power traces on the DUT is:
n2 = αkm = 10000.
VI. CONCLUSION
Designing salware is a way to fight against emerging
threats brought on by the increasing cost of IC manufacturing
(counterfeiting, theft, ...). A famous type of salware is IP
watermarking. In this paper, a new watermark verification
process using a correlation analysis based on the measurement
of the power consumption of an IC is described.
Experimental results are presented and prove that it is
possible to clearly identify different FSMs with the same
watermark key (Kw) and the same FSM with a different wa-
termark key too. Thus, our method is robust against some kinds
of collisions. In addition, the verification scheme is insensitive
to the CMOS process variation. Finally, a discussion about the
choice of the correlation computation process shows that all
parameters can be chosen by the selection of the probability of
the event ζ described in the previous section. The advantage is
that the selection of parameters does not significantly impact
the effectiveness of the verification process.
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